Abstract-Modern e-health systems incorporate different healthcare providers in one system and provide an electronic platform to share medical information efficiently. In cross-context communications between healthcare providers, the same information can be interpreted as different types or values, such as one patient will be issued different identifiers by different healthcare providers. Our research aims to provide a solution to ensure interoperability such that multiple healthcare providers are able to collaborate in one ehealth system. In the realm of this paper, we primarily focus on how different healthcare providers, instead of the patients, are able to interact and share information on a common e-health platform. We point out that the next generation e-health will move towards federated e-health and require user-centricity and transparency properties so that the patients is able to specify and verify the disclosure of their medical information. This paper proposes a new service for cross-context identity management in e-health systems, improving interoperability between agencies when context-specific information is transferred from one healthcare provider to another. How the proposed cross-context identity management service can be integrated in an e-health system is explained with a use case scenario.
Introduction
In recent years, the technological evolution of e-health systems has drawn increasing attention from both industry and research communities world-wide. The goals of e-health systems as follows, are fourfold. Primarily, to provide ubiquitous access to lifelong clinical records of a patient to all relevant stakeholders, including the patient, anytime, anywhere, on any device. In addition, to integrate and enrich the clinical, medical and operational knowledge to support lifelong health guidance of citizens within a community, region, and country. Moreover, to streamline the workflow into shared clinical and operational pathways in order to enable disease management and optimally support the clinical process. Combining these three goals facilitates inter-professional collaboration, while guaranteeing the privacy of the patient.
The major technical challenges facing e-health services are facilitating efficiency, information retrieval and availability, and cross-context interoperability. The rapid aging of populations, combined with pressure on budgets for healthcare delivery, and technological advances are the driving forces behind these challenges. Hence, in the realm of e-health, security and privacy issues have a deep impact. In the realm of this paper, "privacy" means to protect private information of certain entities. Security techniques, such as access control structures, are adopted in e-health systems to ensure that only involved parties have access to sensitive data. The circle of trusted parties should not be extended by moving from a paper-world to an ehealth administration. A patient expects a trust relation with medics; however, as in the past with a doctor's secretary, the trust in the digital world might lead to the need to trust a system administrator too. The adoption of user-centric federated identity management systems can help to keep the circle of trust as small as possible.
In traditional identity management (IDM) systems identity information is hosted and managed by an identity provider using, for example, directory services (LDAP 2006) . It has various advantages from the service provider's point of view, such as being cost effective and easily scalable. The disadvantage is that by applying such an approach, the user loses some control over personal identity information. Recently, this has resulted in the emerging trend for user-centric identity management (Josang & Pope 2005) . In user-centric IDM, the user (e.g. the patient in an e-health application) is put in the centre of interest and is given control over personal information. In particular, this means that the user can influence or even specify which information should be forwarded or revealed to a particular service provider. This has the obvious advantage of better protecting the privacy of each individual user. However, responsibility for storing and updating data then lies with the user.
Existing e-health solutions were mainly concerned with a limited view on patient information utilizing a healthcare provider-centric approach for identity management, mostly limited to a single healthcare provider. Interoperability has become an important issue, especially as more and more healthcare providers collaborate in an e-health system. If we refer to each healthcare provider such as a hospital, GP or clinical research lab as a "context", it is common practice for each entity, such as a patient, to have a unique identifier within a particular context. When context-specific information is transferred from one context to another, the same information can be expressed by means of different types or values. Typically, healthcare providers use different terms for the same entity, strictly relying on dictionaries may be very misleading. Besides, all the information exchanged among healthcare providers in the e-health system needs to be uniquely identified. Therefore, there is a need to have an identity management mechanism in which a mapping of context-specific identifiers and a conversion of context-specific information occurs when data is exchanged among different contexts. Note that the above problem is only a cross-context issue when identifiers should not be shared directly among contexts. Linking information from one context to another should not be straightforward, hence the need for a privacy-friendly but interoperable IDM system. Previous work mostly emphasized the e-health IDM issues from a provider-centric viewpoint. However, existing work of e-health systems reveals an unsatisfactory provision for the interoperability problem in crosscontext IDM systems. Therefore, a new framework is proposed, where each context may deploy a user-centric IDM system, with multiple IDM systems collaborating and information transferring from one IDM system to another.
In this paper, we move towards this framework by defining a new model for identity management with an identifier conversion mechanism to ensure information interoperability in ehealth. Note that we aim to provide an electronic platform to inter-connect multiple healthcare providers and enable them to update and share patients' health information efficiently. In other words, the centre of interest is how different healthcare providers, instead of the patients, are able to collaborate on a common e-health platform efficiently. Though all e-health applications bear the ultimate goal to improve the health situation of the public, it is out of the scope for this paper to explore further on this. The users of the proposed e-health platform are healthcare providers, such as GPs, hospital physicians, etc. A patient, being the holder of health information, can be identified either by the global identifier (e.g. the national registry number or national social security number), or by local identifiers issued by each particular healthcare provider that the patient visited. From the access control point of view, the patients can only read their own health records, and it brings the benefit of increasing transparency; however, write access by the patients to any health records are prohibited. It is because the patients are not trustworthy, and this technical enforcement is necessary in order to prevent patients from altering health records at their own benefit. This paper builds on the results of the IDEM project (IDEM 2008) and the EHIP project (EHIP 2008) , and we will explain how the proposed cross-context IDM service that was developed within the IDEM project can be integrated in the framework of EHIP. The objective of the EHIP project, successfully completed in Flanders, Belgium, is to create a clinical data sharing infrastructure among multiple healthcare providers. The information sharing platform is designed in a way that information, such as patient e-health records, is always available and accessible at the time and place it is required and only to authorised actors. Several key players in e-health, including leading sector companies, several university research groups and large hospitals, have contributed to ensure that the project outcome is valid within a genuine context. In addition, a lifetime view is projected, which will be instrumental in guiding the transition in healthcare systems from provider-centric towards patient-centric.
As the legislation suggested in the following section, patient's national identification number is not to be transferred crosscontext. Therefore, we provide a privacy friendly solution such that each healthcare provider assigns a unique contextspecific identifier for the patient and the patient's medical record respectively. When information, such as patient's medical data and patient identifiers, is transferred cross-context, context-specific information is converted by our identity management mechanism for interoperability.
The rest of the paper outlines the EHIP platform architecture with functional components, followed by an explanation of the proposed cross-context identity management service in ehealth, and a definition of the reversible algorithm to issue and convert context-specific identifiers. Next, how the proposed cross-context IDM service can be integrated in an e-health system is illustrated, with the EHIP platform as a case study. In particular, the motivating scenario, the system model and players, the attack model and assumptions are defined. Services of each entity, the command flow for a service request, and the protocol with the proposed scenario are discussed accordingly. As the final step, related work is introduced, the future outlook for e-health systems together with a conclusion is provided.
Legislation background
In 2006 the United States Department of Health and Human Service Health issued the Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA 2006) . This is a regulation in healthcare to demand the protection of patients data shared from its original source of collection. Since 2005 the processing and movement of personal data is legally regulated by the EU with the Directive 95/46/EC (EU 1995 (EU 1995) provides that "Member States shall determine the conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier of general application may be processed", indicating that governments should carefully consider how they allow national numbers to be used. Regardless of how national identification numbers are regulated in each respective State, they constitute "personal data" by nature within the meaning of Directive 95/46. Art. 16 and 17 of the Directive which imposes upon the controller a general confidentiality and security obligation, including the obligation for the controller to take all reasonable measures "to prevent all other unlawful forms of processing". Regardless of the possible perception that this might lead to massive data aggregation and profiling by the government, on the value of which we give no judgment, it is manifestly clear that the national number is not intended for use outside the governmental context.
The EHIP architecture
Classic community healthcare systems utilize an e-Portal functionality to provide a many-to-one connection between many GP's and one hospital, based on propriety solutions. The disadvantages of this approach are twofold. First, it is impossible to interconnect different entities, such as hospitals. Second, one GP needs multiple portals to access patient data in different hospitals. As an improvement, a centralized infrastructure is enabled in community healthcare. Note that this does not need to imply that data physically resides in a central data store. The advantage of this approach is that users gain a consolidated overview on the clinical data of the patient, to which clinical research institutes and healthcare providers can interconnect.
The EHIP infrastructure aims to promote community healthcare and international standards on different forums. It provides a horizontal infrastructure for e-health applications compatible with international standards of Cross-Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS 2007) by Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE 2007 ) and technologies such as Web 2.0 to be used in web-based portals (AJAX 2006 , Portlet 2008 , which are interoperable within the Belgian e-health digital platform BeHealth (BeHealth 2006) infrastructure and hospital IT systems, with respect to security and privacy. On the other hand, it provides a vertical application-based prototype for hospitals and GPs to share a patient's Electronic Health Record (EHR), such as medical summary, clinical results and patient discharge letters.
Take in Figure ( No.1), for the functional components of the EHIP platform. Based on a Service Oriented Architecture, where each subsystem exposes its functionality through a service interface, it utilizes a central document registry to contain the metadata of all available documents, and distributed document stores, where medical documents are stored in local repositories of the corresponding healthcare providers. The EHIP platform also contains a gateway to support healthcare providers with limited resources, such as small practices that cannot afford a repository. Further, the platform provides Internet-enabled access to the resources through a Web portal, which facilitates actions such as accessing the platform afterhours. Documents in the platform share a common content model as Clinical Document Architecture (HL7/CDA 2007), such that all parties, despite their heterogeneous internal systems, gain easy access. The architecture employs federated security, in which security is embedded in middleware. Federated policy enforcement at hospitals and GPs surgeries with a central policy management are deployed for access control, i.e., authentication and authorisation, in compliance with the EU data protection directive. According to XDS, the EHR security is covered by the following Integration Profiles (XDS 2007) : the Audit Trail and Node Authentication Profile to provide audit trail and the Cross Enterprise User Authentication Profile to provide a federated identity management framework based on SAML that enables Single Sign-On functionality across multiple enterprises. Wuyts et al. (Wuyts et al. 2008 ) provide a security enhanced software architecture with an analysis of potential security risks threatening XDScompliant systems, such as the EHIP infrastructure.
Cross-context identity management in ehealth
In this section, we look at identity management from an ehealth prospective. In general, there are two types of identifiers in the EHIP system: a global identifier of a patient, e.g., the national identification number, and context-specific identifiers. The context-specific identifiers in the system are used to locally identify a patient and the patient's medical record within a specific context, e.g., a healthcare provider. As mentioned in previous sections, all healthcare providers may have heterogeneous internal systems, and each healthcare provider typically issues its own unique context-specific identifier to patient as well as to the patient's medical record, that will be stored in the local repository of the corresponding healthcare provider. This means, the one patient will be issued different identifiers from different healthcare providers, similarly the patient's medical records stored in different healthcare providers will be assigned with different document identifiers. According to the legal restrictions explained, for privacy protection, it is not advised to share the patient's global identifier among contexts.
We now attempt to expand the notion of e-health identity management to multiple contexts interacting and communicating with each other. One complication that occurs is that administrations need to exchange information coming from different contexts. For example, one healthcare provider tries to query the medical record concerning a patient from another healthcare provider, such that context-specific information is exchanged from one context to another. Further, the personal information exchanged needs to be uniquely identified, but the same identifier should not be shared among contexts. Whenever information is exchanged between different contexts a mapping and conversion of identifiers is required. In order to exchange information between contexts, an identifier mapping and conversion is performed by a trusted party which is available for each context. (Modinis 2006) Since linkability of information from one context to another is desirable but not yet feasible, a manageable system for information interoperability is required. Therefore, or goal is to provide a crosscontext IDM system, compatible with all the internal systems employed by the entities in the e-health platform, to translate and convert context-specific information and identifiers used and exchanged between the concerned entities.
Figure 2 Cross-context information exchange in federated ehealth
Take in Figure ( No.2), which depicts a cross-context information exchange in the e-health application context. An administrative organisation of a healthcare provider can be separated as front and back offices. The front office is connected with portals and local repositories. It directly interacts with its users, while the back office provides services for system support, such as identity management, authentication, authorisation, information sharing, and auditing. The identity provider from the back office issues context-specific identifiers to its patients. Each healthcare provider is responsible for the issuance and use of context-specific identifiers within its context. Accordingly, one healthcare provider cannot prevent another healthcare provider from issuing context-specific identifiers for its patients within a particular context. When healthcare providers communicate, information can be exchanged through a mediating service provided by the ehealth platform. The mediating service, that is to say a trusted party available for each context, is responsible for mapping and converting context-specific information, such as identifiers, exchanged between the communicating parties. This paper does not focus on how information is exchanged exactly, since it depends on semantic models, and application and communication-specific scenarios. Instead, the contexts and entities involved in this communication are explored. In later sections, we explain how context-specific information can be converted and exchanged between contexts within a real-life scenario. Take in Figure (No.3) . The abstract structure of cross-context IDM applied in a communication can be presented as an interconnected solar system. In e-health, node A, B, E, etc. denote back offices. They can be the central server of a hospital, or a gateway connecting various portals of different departments of a hospital. In a cross-context communication between a service provider and a service requester, the conversion of context-specific identifiers is performed by a trusted agent as the mediator, denoted by node C, D, and G.
Cross-context IDM in the EHIP platform: a case study
In this section, we introduce how context-specific identifiers can be computed from global identifiers, and the reverse operation. Next, we explain how context-specific identifiers can be converted and exchanged across-context in the EHIP platform in a real-life scenario.
Reversible identifiers

Figure 4 Algorithm to issue a context-specific identifier
Take in Figure ( No.4) to generate a patient's context-specific identifier from his/her global identifier. Anon is defined as a deterministic algorithm to issue a context-specific identifier. The context-specific reference of any length is the input to a pseudo-random function with a secret key, such as a hash function, and results a fixed-length message digest as a prefix. Then the prefix is concatenated to the global identifier, and encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm with a second secret key, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The result is the context-specific identifier. Note that the secret keys for encryption and pseudo-random function should be different. Take in Figure ( No.5), the reverse process to convert the patient's global identifier from the context-specific identifier is defined as Deanon. The context-specific identifier is the input to a symmetric decryption algorithm, controlled by the secret key. The result is the prefix concatenated with the global identifier. The prefix is easily removed allowing the global identifier to be recovered.
System model
Consider the following scenario: suppose in the EHIP network, a generic hospital H1 intends to query a medical record of patient A from a psychiatric hospital H2, through the EHIP registry R.
The system model we consider consists of the following players:
Hospital H1 is a generic hospital context, whose back office contains a file repository FR1, a patient ID provider PIP1, a document ID provider DIP1, and a document anonymizer DA1. Hospital H2 is a psychiatric hospital context, whose back office contains a file repository FR2, a patient ID provider PIP2, a document ID provider DIP2, and a document anonymizer DA2. Patient A is a patient that requests healthcare services from a healthcare provider. Let GID denote A's global identifier, e.g., the patient's national number. Let PIDj denote A's context-specific identifier, i.e., a pseudonym, assigned by the healthcare provider Hj. Let DIDj denote the pseudonym for A's medical record DocAj stored in the context Hj. EHIP Registry R is a central registry that maintains a link between a patient's global ID and the locations of each healthcare provider that stores the patient's medical records.
Attack model and assumptions
The objective of an attacker Eve is to obtain private information from a particular patient. In the proposed scenario, Eve may either try to obtain the patient's global ID or the patient's sensitive medical information from the psychiatric hospital H2.
In order to do so, Eve has several options: first, she tries to request the patient's global identifier from the identity providers of each healthcare provider or the central registry. Then, Eve tries to request the sensitive medical data directly from the hospital H2. After which, Eve tries to steal the secret keys of any identity providers or the document anonymizer in the system, in order to access the sensitive data. In addition, Eve tries to break into the system. Finally, she could try to eavesdrop to obtain the desired content. An attacker can be categorised as either internal to the e-health network, or external. An internal attacker can be either an authorised or unauthorised recipient of the e-health system services. We assume all the external attackers outside the e-health network are unauthenticated and unauthorised entities to the system.
The following assumptions hold for the proposed system. All entities that have been authenticated and authorised by the system are assumed trustworthy. The system is not protected against malicious entities that are able to authenticate themselves and who are authorised to use the system's services. We assume that all security-enhancing functionalities employed in the system are robust and well-deployed. All secret keys of the entities in the system are stored physically secure. The communication takes place through a secure communication channel.
Proposed approach
Services provided by each entity
In the hospital context Hj, let KPj denote the secret key of the patient ID provider PIPj, and let KDj denote the secret key of the document ID provider DIPj. The ID providers PIPj and DIPj are able to provide two services: IDIssue and the IDConvert. Let KDocj denote the secret key of the document anonymizer DAj, and DAj is able to provide two services: DocAnon and DocDeanon. Both Hj's file repository FRj and the EHIP central registry R can provide the service Query.
Each service is described as follows:
IDIssue: a service to issue context-specific identifiers from global identifiers. IDConvert: a service to convert context-specific identifiers to global identifiers. DocAnon: a service to pseudonymize a document by encrypting part of a document that contains sensitive medical information. DocDeanon: a service to convert a pseudonymized document back to the non-pseudonymized version by decryption. Query: a database query service with the input of some attributes and the output of some other attributes from the database.
Proposed approach to request a service Take in Figure ( No.6). Each time before a service is delivered to a service requester from a service provider, the service requester needs to be authenticated and authorised. The information flow to request a service contains the following steps: 1. A service requester sends a service request to a service provider. 2. The service provider forwards the request to its security facade to check the requester. 3. The security facade checks the requester's authenticity and authorisation. 4. If the checks are passed, the security façade informs the service provider to deliver the required service. Otherwise, the service delivery is denied.
5. The service provider delivers the service to the service requester.
Protocol of the proposed scenario Take in Figure (No.7) . It presents the protocol of the scenario that the generic hospital H1 queries a medical record of a patient A from the psychiatric hospital H2 through the registry R in the EHIP system. Note that R serves as the mediator for the cross-context communication between H1 and H2. The registry R of the e-health platform interacts with the ID providers of the two contexts (i.e., hospitals H1 and H2) as well as issues and converts context-specific identifiers.
Take in Figure ( No.8). Information is transferred cross-context in the following steps: 1. H1 queries R with the context-specific patient ID PidA1 of a patient A. 2. R requests the IDConvert service with PidA1 from H1's patient ID provider PIP1, in order to obtain the global ID GidA of A. 3. After the authentication and authorisation check of R by H1, PIP1 performs IDConvert on PidA1 with a secret key Kp1, and then delivers the result global identifier GidA to R. 4. R queries its database to retrieve the corresponding location of the hospital where A's medical record is stored, which is assumed at H2. 5. R requests the IDIssue service from H2's document ID provider DIP2 with GidA. 6. After the authentication and authorisation check, DIP2
provides R the context-specific document ID of A's medical record stored in H2. 7. R sends DidA2 and H2's location information to H1. 8. H1 sends a query to H2 with DidA2. 9. H2 queries its file repository FR2 and retrieves A's medical record DocA2. 10. H2 requests the DocAnon service from its document anonymizer DA2 for an anonymized version of DocA2. 11. After the authentication and authorisation check, DA2 performs the document pseudonymisation service DocAnon on DocA, resulting in the pseudonymized medical record AnonDocA2. 12. H2 delivers the requested medical record AnonDocA2 to H1 through a secure channel.
Security analysis
In this section, we present a security analysis of our proposed solution, in correspondence to the attack models. We will show, under the predefined assumptions, why those potential attacks cannot be performed successfully in our system. Firstly, it is important to assume that all entities which are authenticated and authorised to obtain a certain service from a service provider are trustworthy, and vice versa. We also assume that any entity, who fails to pass a service provider's authentication or authorisation check, should not obtain the corresponding service.
As explained above, the system is not protected against malicious entities that are checked as authenticated and authorised. Now we consider the attacker Eve as an unauthenticated or unauthorised entity, and examine the five misuse cases Eve may perform. In the first and the second misuse cases, Eve tries to request the patient's global identifier with the IDConvert service from any of the healthcare provider's identity providers or from the central registry. Or, she tries to request the sensitive medical data directly from the hospital H2. However, neither case is possible, because in order to receive the service, Eve has to pass the authentication and authorisation check by the service providers. The third attack Eve may perform is to attempt to steal the secret keys of any identity providers or the document anonymizer in the sys-tem, such that she could perform the IDConvert service or the DocDeanon service to obtain the desired information. This is unfeasible for Eve, since we assume all secret keys of the entities in the system are stored securely. In the next misuse case, Eve may try to hack the system and breakdown the security. This option is not feasible either, because all the security-enhancing functionalities employed in the system are assumed to be robust and well-deployed in the proposed system. If Eve fails to perform all the above attacks, Eve can still try to eavesdrop on the communication content. However, presumably, the communication is taking place through a secure communication channel with client-side and server-side authentication.
We can conclude from the above analysis that the security of the proposed system depends on the security of the secret key, the security of the communication channel, and the security of the underlying system security infrastructure, such as the security of the authentication and authorisation mechanisms.
Related work
Various popular user-centric identity management systems developed over the past years include Shibboleth (Shibboleth 2001 , Scavo & Cantor 2005 , Liberty Alliance (Liberty 2006 (Liberty , 2008 , CardSpace (CardSpace 2007), and Idemix (Idemix 2008 , Camenisch & Herreweghen 2002 . In the literature, there are some identity management schemes proposed for ehealth utilizing a user-centric approach. Peyton et al. (Peyton et al. 2007 ) use a simple ePrescription scenario to analyze the business and technical issues to be addressed in a Liberty Alliance-based federated identity management framework for e-health. They look at the potential impact of privacy compliance on three existing components of the framework, namely, Discovery Service, Identity Mapping Service and Interaction Service. A fourth component Audit Service is proposed to address potential privacy breeches in Liberty Alliance. Au and Croll (Au & Croll 2008) recently proposed a new framework for a consumer-centric identity management for distributed eHealth. The healthcare consumer maintains a pool of pseudonym identifiers in their personal secure device for use in different healthcare services, perhaps in the form of a smart card. Without revealing consumer identity, health record data from different medical databases distributed in various points of clinical service can be collected and linked together on demand. In particular, pseudonym identifiers are cryptographically generated by a trustee, and the binding of an identifier to the identity key or another identifier is certified by a Key Binding Certificate issued by the trustee. Hence, security of the interactions among different entities in the architecture is guaranteed by certification and cryptographic technologies.
Some results have been published on privacy protection and secondary use issues of EHR. Iacono et al. (Iacono 2007) discuss the importance of protecting the privacy of patient data kept in an EHR in cases where it leaves the control-and protection-sphere of the health care realm for secondary uses such as clinical or epidemiological research projects, health care research, and assessment of treatment quality or economic assessments. The work focuses on multi-centric studies, where various data sources are linked together using Grid technologies. It introduces a pseudonymisation system which enables multi-centric universal pseudonymisation, meaning that a patient's identity will result in the same pseudonym, regardless of which participating study centre the patient data is collected. Pommerening and Reng (Pommerening & Reng 2004) addressed the issue of secondary uses of EHR, such as health economy and health care research, or disease specific clinical or epidemiological research. For these uses in general, the patient identity must be anonymized or pseudonymized. Their work describes possible model architectures, developed for medical research networks, but useful in broader contexts.
In Europe, there are several research projects on cross-border identity management. The concept of context-specific identifiers was introduced in the Modinis Study on Identity Management (Modinis 2006 ). Modinis-IDM (ModinisIDM 2006) was an EU funded identity management project which focused interoperability aspects of identity management systems used in the EU Member States. It aims was to build on expertise and initiatives in the EU Member States to progress towards a coherent approach in electronic identity management in eGovernment in the European Union. The study addresses interoperability issues in cross-context IDM in eGovernment, without ignoring differences in legal and cultural practices within the EU framework for data protection. GUIDE (GUIDE 2006) was also an EC funded project aiming the creation of an architecture that will enable open and interoperable eGovernment electronic identity services in the EU. Its objective concerns interoperability across national systems and structures within broader transnational, policy, legislative, and socioeconomic boundaries. The PRIME (PRIME 2008) project looked at the applicability issues of using the federated identity management system Idemix open source initiative and digital credentials in detail. The main contribution of this European research project is a broader understanding of the dependencies between the different components in such a system. These dependencies are reflected by both identity management architecture and an integrated prototype. FIDIS (FIDIS 2008 Practical implications and future trends User-centricity: patient specification E-health systems are evolving towards user-centric, where the patients are able to control the granularity of healthcare information disclosed to the third party; and specify the content of the health information and to which healthcare provider the information can be disclosed, the purpose of processing the information, etc.
Transparency: patient verification
Transparency will be emphasized more in e-health systems such that the patients should be able to access and query the logs of their health records, in order to verify if their records were access according to the refined rules.
Federated e-health with interoperability
Another trend is federated e-health, including federation of identity information and healthcare information. Traditional ehealth systems are typically integrated within each healthcare provider; however it lacks interconnection between different healthcare providers. In this case, the patients function as the only link, carrying their medical files from one healthcare provider to another. Application Programming Interface (API) is available to specify how individual e-health system works in each healthcare provider, and there is no interaction between different APIs.
The next generation e-health systems are able to offer collaboration between healthcare providers by using a data bus interconnecting different service providers, while each API will be not only available but also used for the exchange of health information. In this setting, each healthcare provider has its own database, and the database is accessible from outside the healthcare provider, and the database in one healthcare provider is accessible from the outside by another healthcare provider. As explained in previous sections, the information with the same meaning can be interpreted as different types or values by different healthcare providers. Therefore, interoperability is required to ensure information federation in ehealth systems. The healthcare information stored in the local database is transferred and translated by the data bus and can be shared between two or more healthcare providers. Interoperability can be realized by implementing and using the APIs specified within each provider.
Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a new service for cross-context identity management in the e-health application domain, aiming to improve interoperability when context-specific information is transferred between contexts. Previous e-health IDM solutions mainly have a limited view on patient information, where a user-centric approach for identity management usually was restricted to a single healthcare provider. Interoperability becomes more problematic in an e-health system when more actors collaborate, such as hospitals, GPs, clinical research labs, pharmacists, etc. In such systems, it is common for a patient to be issued different unique context-specific identifiers from different healthcare providers. In crosscontext communications, the same information can be expressed by means of different types or values. Since identifiers are not shared directly among contexts, linkability from one context to another should not be straightforward. However, other forms of linkability, such as the possibility to follow-up a patient's medical treatment, is desirable in the e-health sector, even when it needs to cross different contexts. Therefore, in the e-health context, we design an identity management mechanism in which a mapping and conversion of contextspecific identifiers or information occurs when data is exchanged among different authorised healthcare providers. Further, we propose an algorithm for issuing and converting context-specific identifiers, based on cryptographic techniques.
As an illustration of the concept, we presented our research activities on the IDM aspect of the EHIP project, with a reallife use case scenario to explain how the proposed crosscontext IDM service can be integrated in the EHIP e-health platform. As the next step of our research, we are looking for solutions on how to extend the framework to provide federated authentication and federated authorisation mechanisms. Further work is needed to define methods for federation and management of authorisations. 
Terminology and Definition
Access control
Digital Identity Definition: A digital identity is a partial identity in an electronic form.
A digital identity can be created on the fly when a particular identity transaction is desired. A digital identity is, by definition, a subset of the identity, and can in effect be considered a manifestation of an entity's presence in an electronic IDM system (i.e., it is the subset of attributes belonging to an entity that is accessible through a specific IDM system).
Federated Identity
Definition: A federated identity is a credential of an entity that links an entity's partial entity from one context to a partial entity from another context.
Identification
Definition: Identification is the process of using claimed or observed attributes of an entity to deduce who the entity is. The term identification is also referred to as entity authentication. The identification of an entity within a certain context enables another entity to distinguish between the entities it interacts with. In an IDM context, privacy is mostly used as a synonym of informational privacy, i.e., the interest of a natural person to control, or at least significantly influence the handling of data about themselves, also taking into account the nature of the applicable attributes and the entity in charge of data management.
Pseudonym
Definition: A Pseudonym is an arbitrary identifier of an identifiable entity, by which a certain action can be linked to this specific entity. The entity that may be identified by the pseudonym is the holder of the pseudonym. A pseudonym is typically a fictitious name that can refer to an entity without using any of the entity's identifiers. As identifiers, pseudonyms are contextbound, and one pseudonym is not necessarily valid across multiple identity management systems. An entity is pseudonymous if it relies on a pseudonym as identifier. The procedure by which all person-related data within a data record is replaced by one pseudonym is pseudonymisation. 
Trusted third party (TTP)
Definition: A trusted third party is an entity trusted by multiple other entities within a specific context and which is alien to their internal relationship.
